

# ***Africa Report***

May, 1961

**Jomo Kenyatta:**

*The Man and the Myth*

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**Jomo Kenyatta**

(Photo by Tom Mboya)

(London Daily Express)

# Africa Report

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## In This Issue

### Articles

- |                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| The Brazzaville Twelve              | 2 |
| Calm Before the Storm in Cameroun?  | 3 |
| Jomo Kenyatta: the Myth and the Man | 5 |

### Departments

- |                |    |
|----------------|----|
| News Review    | 9  |
| Books          | 13 |
| Economic Notes | 7  |

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# The Brazzaville Twelve And How They Came To Be

By HELLA PICK\*

Though there are such combinations as the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union and the *Entente* of the Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta, and Dahomey, deep divisions appear to have developed among independent African countries. These, though, are early days, and it is impossible to know whether the present divisions will deepen; whether the dream of African unity will be shattered or whether it still has a chance of fulfilment, and in what shape. To begin with, it is easy to exaggerate the depth of the present divisions. There is a tendency to attach fashionable labels to the Brazzaville and Casablanca Groups.

To one school of thought, the Brazzaville Group seems pro-Western, rational, and practical in its approach to international affairs and the problems of African unity, while the Casablanca Group is fellow-travelling, if not actually Communist, and full of unrealistic ideas about African unity.

### On the Other Hand

From another standpoint, the Casablanca Group is the true expression of independent Africa, determined to be neutralist in its external relations, and firm in the conviction that for the furthering of unity among African States, the political kingdom has clear priority over the economic. This school considers the Brazzaville Group a sort of front-organization for French neo-colonialism, and argues that the Group's members have achieved little more than a paper independence.

The truth lies somewhere beyond all these assertions, and it is certainly open to doubt whether there are at the present time such fundamental divisions of political philosophy or political allegiance in Africa as to preclude eventual cooperation, if not actual unity.

The whole history—if a few months' existence merits such a description—of the Brazzaville and Casablanca Groups shows that they were formed and developed to deal with two specific problems: two major ones, Algeria and the Congo; and a minor one, Mauritania. Other questions, such as economic links, political ties, and even defense agreements have come to be considered by the Groups; but the two major points of focus

around which the two Groups developed are undoubtedly Algeria and the Congo. If these two running sores can be cured quickly enough—and speed is a vital element—then there is an excellent chance that independent Africa's present divisions will not be perpetuated.

No doubt there are those who will claim that differences over Algeria and the Congo arose only because of already existing and deep-seated doctrinal differences. They may well be right; though I personally believe that the frontiers of ideas in independent Africa are still loose and flexible, and that there is every possibility of mutual accommodation, provided representative African governments can be established in Algeria and the Congo before the tussle for footholds in Africa by the great powers becomes more predatory.

The so-called Brazzaville Group was formed in October 1960—its first Heads-of-State meeting was at Abidjan in the Ivory Coast, and only its second meeting was held at Brazzaville, the city from which the Group derived its name. Its 12 members are all French-speaking states. Eleven of them are former French colonies—Senegal, Mauritania, the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey, Chad, Gabon, the Central African Republic, the Congo Republic (Brazzaville), and finally, the somewhat reluctantly-recruited island of Madagascar, whose President did not attend the inaugural meeting but went to Brazzaville. The twelfth member of the Group is not a former French colony, but something very close—a former French-administered UN Trust Territory, Cameroun.

### Houphouet Sets Pace

The original meeting of the Group at Abidjan was organized by President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. And he made no bones about it: he wanted a meeting to discuss whether the independent African States could mediate or in some other way help bring the Algeria conflict to an end without alienating France.

For weeks before the Abidjan meeting, Houphouet-Boigny had been feeling his way. There were rumors of contacts with President Bourguiba of Tunisia, and of a motion on Algeria which the Ivory Coast was drafting for the UN General Assembly. At the Nigerian independence celebrations at the beginning of October, Houphouet discussed his idea for a meeting of French African states on Algeria, and there was much coming and going at Houphouet's rooms in the Federal Palace Hotel. Then, a few days later,

(Continued on page 8)

\* Miss Pick is a frequent contributor on French-speaking Africa to *The Guardian* and the British Broadcasting Corporation; this article is an abbreviated version of a longer report published in the London periodical *Africa South in Exile*.

# Calm Before the Storm in Cameroun?

By VICTOR T. LE VINE\*

Yaounde

After 16 months of independence, Cameroun gives every outward indication of having passed the first, difficult post-independence stages with flying colors.

The threat posed by the revolutionary, Conakry-based group headed by Dr. Felix Moumie appears to have vanished with the death of Dr. Moumie in Geneva last November. Except for a few marauding terrorist bands, the troubled Bamileke, Mungo, and Wouri areas of the south are now calm and agriculture in those sections has recovered considerably. Accords for financial and technical assistance have been signed with France, West Germany, the United Nations special African fund, the OEEC, and other international agencies.

The northern-based governing party, headed by President Ahmadou Ahidjo, has consolidated its position by organizing sections in the southern and western parts of the country and has absorbed two southern political groups, the *Mouvement d'Action Nationale* and *Paysans Camerounais*. Cameroun has coordinated its activities in the international sphere with the so-called "African nations of French expression," also known as the "Brazzaville Twelve," and the group has laid plans for economic and political cooperation that cannot but benefit Cameroun.

## Troubles on the Horizon

Despite the superficial brightness of this picture, trouble may be brewing for the Ahidjo regime. The February 1961 plebiscite in the British Cameroons appears to have created more problems than it solved, and these problems have already begun to plague President Ahidjo and his colleagues.

The February plebiscite, held under UN auspices, consisted, in fact, of two separate plebiscites, one in the northern and one in the southern sections of the Trust Territory. (See "The British Cameroons: Reluctant February Bride?" by Mr. Le Vine in *Africa Report*, February 1961). The alternatives put before the electorate were identical—that is, a choice between joining the Cameroun Republic or Nigeria. It will be recalled that the Southern Cameroons opted for the Cameroun Republic by a vote of 233,571 to 97,741, while the Northern Cameroons chose to join the Northern Region of Nigeria by a vote of 146,296 to 97,659.

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The results in both sections of the Trust Territory came as a shock to the Cameroun Government. On the one hand, it had expected that the Northern Cameroons would choose the Republic, and, on the other, it was astounded by the margin by which the pro-Cameroun vote won in the south. In both cases, the results were harbingers of difficulties ahead.

## Cameroun Protests to the UN

The Cameroun Government's first reaction to the outcome of the Northern Cameroons plebiscite was that foul play had been committed, and that the results had been falsified. So wrought up did the government become that it immediately lodged a complaint with the United Nations to the effect that the plebiscite did not represent the free choice of the Northern Cameroonian voters.

Both the Administering Authority (Great Britain) and the United Nations plebiscite supervisory team were charged with having permitted, even condoned, irregularities in the registration procedures, the conduct of the polling, and the counting of ballots. Moreover, Nigeria was accused of having sent 700 policemen into the area shortly before the plebiscite, ostensibly to intimidate the voters, forcing them, as it were, "to vote at the point of a bayonet." These and other charges were collected into a government "white paper" and sent to New York.

The UN General Assembly, in one of its last meetings of the current session on April 21, rejected the Camerounian complaint and approved the recent plebiscite results. Twenty-three nations, spearheaded by the French-speaking nations of the Brazzaville Twelve and including also France, Israel, and some Latin countries, supported the Cameroun position, but the General Assembly voted nonetheless (64-23-10 abstentions) to approve the absorption of the northern section by Nigeria on June 1 and the absorption of the southern section by Cameroun on October 1.

## Repercussions at Home

Though the issue is an international one, the outcome of the case could profoundly affect the government's position at home. The Government's prestige and popularity is bound to be affected adversely by this defeat, while the alliance of former and present opposition forces confronting it will be conversely strengthened. It is in this latter connection that the situation growing out of the Southern Cameroons plebiscite becomes crucial.

The huge margin with which the Cameroun alternative won in the Southern Cameroons was undoubtedly mainly due to the skill with which

Prime Minister John Foncha of the Southern Cameroun managed the pre-plebiscite campaign. Mr. Foncha marshalled his forces and appeals so effectively that only seven of the 26 plebiscite districts tallied in favor of Nigeria. Everyone, including most of the politicians in Yaounde, thought the margin would be smaller and were hence astonished by the results. It was astonishment that was mixed with a good deal of apprehension at the vastly improved bargaining position the victory had given Mr. Foncha.



John Foncha

—UN photo

In essence, Mr. Foncha commands an electorate of about 350,000, a voting bloc large enough to be critical in any future elections to the legislature of the proposed United Kamerun Federation. It is small wonder, then, that Mr. Foncha has been privately and publicly wooed by both the Ahidjo Government and opposition groups in and out of the Cameroun National Assembly. He has had talks with Prince Douala Manga Bell, Dr. Beybey Eyidi, Daniel Kemajou, and other opposition leaders, and the fear is growing in government circles that some sort of "Western coalition" (including the Bamileke, Mungo, Wouri, and Sanaga-Maritime *départements*, from which most of the opposition forces derive) may be in the making. If this is the case, the government might stand to lose the support of a group of 18 Bamileke deputies, whose alliance with the government rests on the most tenuous links.

A "Western coalition," with Fon-



cha at its head, would have enough strength to topple the Ahidjo regime, even in the face of the government's improved position elsewhere in the country. This is the vision which haunts the government, and this is undoubtedly why the loss of the Northern Cameroons' electorate is so upsetting to Mr. Ahidjo and his colleagues. With the Northern Cameroons, which would undoubtedly have been controlled by the Northern-based Cameroon governing party, an effective balance might have been struck to counter the voting potential of the Southern Cameroons. Without the northern area to bolster Ahidjo's position, Mr. Foncha is in a good position to demand, and get, virtually any arrangement he wishes—either with the government or the opposition forces.

#### What Does Foncha Want?

The extent of Mr. Foncha's ambitions or the possible strength of a Foncha-led opposition are not matters to be taken lightly. Not two weeks after the plebiscite, Mr. Foncha took pains to deny that he had any desire to become president of the future Cameroons (or Kamerun, or Cameroun) Federation—but in the re-

<sup>1</sup> The size of registration for the plebiscite. There are about 800,000 inhabitants in the Southern Cameroons.

verse language of politics, this sounded like a reminder of his availability. He has said that he seeks a Cameroons Federation in which the Southern Cameroons would remain much the same as it is now, with the powers presently held by the Administering Authority to be vested in the central government of the Federation.

#### Ahidjo Cool

This is not an arrangement which is favored by President Ahidjo; as a matter of fact, when Foncha first suggested it in Yaounde last year, he was turned down out of hand. But this, of course, was before the February plebiscite.

The long-awaited post-plebiscite conference has not yet met, nor has a date for it been agreed upon. A preliminary meeting involving British and Cameroun representatives foundered on the Cameroun truculence over the Northern Cameroons issue. When the conference finally does meet, however, Mr. Foncha will be holding a good many aces, and there is little doubt that he will play them with effect.

Observers here feel that, at least for now, Mr. Foncha will agree to the formation of a loose Cameroons federation. What he will do when the inevitable federal elections come up is another question.

## African Resources Topic of Discussion At N. Y. Conference

Some 250 American businessmen met with representatives of trade and industry from African nations to discuss ways of furthering trade and investment between the United States and African nations at New York University March 27-29.

The Conference on African Resources was sponsored by New York University and African Fair, Inc., and chaired by Eric Johnston, President of the Motion Picture Association of America. Speakers included Ambassador Averill Harriman; Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennon Williams; Robert I. Fleming, Director of the West Africa Program of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund; and African Ambassadors George Padmore of Liberia, Louis Ignacio Pinto of Dahomey, Jaja Wachuku of Nigeria, and W. M. Q. Halm of Ghana.

The conference urged the establishment of a clearinghouse of information on investment, trade, and development possibilities in tropical Africa, to be organized by American businessmen. A full report of the conference will be available shortly.

## Self-Criticism in Guinea . . .

The news that Guinea has decided to close down its nationalized trading organizations—the famous *Comptoirs de Commerce Guineens*—should not be passed over lightly. It may well prove a landmark in the economic and ideological development of Africa. Newly independent states have been assiduously “shopping” in East and West for ideas as well as for goods, credits, and technical know-how. Some have “bought” here, some there; most have made “purchases” on both sides. Among several trends and philosophies that have competed for favor, Guinea has hitherto gone furthest in borrowing from Communism in its organization of commerce and the *Comptoirs* were the center and the symbol of this policy.

All the details are not yet available, but it is definitely reported that the intention is to return the distribution of imports into private hands. In future all licenses, currency arrangements, price controls, and import policies will be dealt with by the Ministry of Commerce, which will not discriminate between public and private enterprises.

#### Frustrations Noted

That the system of centralized buying, distribution, and selling of imports has been difficult to apply has been apparent for some time. At last year's Kissidougou conference of the PDG, there were frank comments on bad distribution of essential goods within the country. There had been queues in the shops and shortages annoying both to the sophisticated Conakry dweller and the villager. In practice the *Comptoirs* could not handle as much business as they did in theory. What happened in the case of the *Comptoir de Commerce Extérieur* was that for every import item required by a

private trader a license was required. Licenses were sometimes forthcoming, sometimes not: a frustrating situation. But the real failure was with the distribution functions of the *Comptoir de Commerce Intérieur*. Sekou Toure has now admitted, with that forthright self-criticism on domestic matters which is one of the better imports from the Russians, that there were 120,000 tons of goods waiting to be distributed in Conakry port, which would need two or three thousand lorries to move.

#### Lessons Learned

The Guineans have clearly learned a lesson. The lesson for the rest of us is that a central objection to the Communist concept of trade—the objection that it puts absolute economic power in the hands of a bureaucracy which could be more advantageously wielded by private individuals—applies above all in those African states where the bureaucracy lacks even the degree of efficiency and tradition of service it has in the Soviet Union. This is not to say that actions inspired by socialistic principles are now considered inappropriate in Guinea, or that they should be so considered elsewhere. Simultaneously with the news about the *Comptoirs*, Guinea announces that she has nationalized diamond and gold mining and now comes the first anniversary of the new Guinea franc, symbol of her economic radicalism. It is triumphantly claimed that reform has served its purpose admirably. In a number of fields Guinea has been leading the way in Africa and she has now shown that she can lead in more than one direction.

—Reprinted, with permission, from the weekly, *West Africa*

# Jomo Kenyatta: *The Man and the Myth*

Nairobi

One day, in the very near future, the world will hear the news that Jomo Kenyatta has finally been released from restriction. There will be no final political solution in Kenya until the day comes, but at present his fate is being kept delicately in the balance between the pressures of African nationalism and the internal political requirements of Britain's Conservative Party.

At nearly 70 years of age, Kenyatta has become the living symbol of African freedom to almost every African in Kenya who has the vaguest political interest. Africans see him as a national leader standing high above tribal conflict and above the personality differences which now divide their other leaders.

Kenyatta, with his piercing eyes, his bushy beard, his carved cane, and flamboyant gestures, has been removed from the rough and tumble of everyday politics for nearly 10 years now—long enough to become a hero and a myth. Meanwhile, however, the majority of Kenya Europeans still fear and mistrust him, and the Kenya Government has not departed from its view that he was the leader of Mau Mau or, in the recent words of Kenya Governor Sir Patrick Renison, "the leader of darkness and death."

## The Twig is Bent

To understand Kenyatta, one has to go back to the time he was born. The approximate date was 1893. Both his parents were Kikuyu. As a very young lad, he herded his family's cattle in the lush, green, intensively cultivated Kikuyuland. He was brought up according to tribal custom, passing through the various initiation ceremonies into boyhood and manhood with the other young men of his own "age group".

His grandfather was a man of great prestige and influence in the tribe. He was a witch doctor, a "mundo mugu", who acted as a doctor and a general adviser to the tribe on spiritual problems. Kenyatta learned much of his grandfather's craft and he later testified in his book, *Facing Mount Kenya*, that a love magic spell he had once tried had "undoubtedly proved successful."

Kenyatta's orthodox tribal upbringing throws much light on his apparently ambivalent views in later life. Even when he assumed the role of a Westernized politician bent on leading his people into the modern world, he would still defend archaic customs of his tribe—including female circumcision.

At 10 years of age, he left the herd of cattle he was tending and ran away to a Church of Scotland Mission Sta-



"Perhaps the most currently interesting question is what kind of person Kenyatta is and was. Here is a man who had dabbled in Quakerism, seen and rejected Communism, produced a major piece of anthropological scholarship, and who is now reliably said to be a follower of Gandhian non-violence and a devotee of classical music. Could such a man have interrupted this type of personal development with an interlude so degrading and bestial as Mau Mau involved?"—From a review in the London Fabian periodical *Venture* of the recently-published book, "Jomo Kenyatta" by George Delf, Victor Gollancz, 1961, 21s.

tion in a village called Kikuyu to start his formal education. He was attracted by the glamor of the booming pioneer town of Nairobi, which had been nothing more than a rail-head camp for workers on the Uganda Railway a few years before. Soon he left school and became a houseboy in one of the new corrugated iron houses on wooden stilts owned by a European, J. Cooke.

His employer, recognizing his natural intelligence and taking account of his mission school education, later found him a job as a clerk in the Ministry of Works.

## Political Beginnings

Kenya's first recognizable political movement did not appear before 1921, when the Young Kikuyu Association, later the Kikuyu Central Association, was formed under the leadership of Harry Thuku. Jomo Kenyatta joined

in 1922. His interest in politics rapidly developed: by 1925, he was an official in the party and by 1928 he had taken up politics as a full-time activity and had become editor of a Kikuyu newsheet.

## Tensions Appear Early

Before the 1920's there was no real black-white conflict in Kenya. The tribes were ruled by chiefs and paternal white administrators. There were no channels of political expression open to Africans and the idea of African representatives in the Legislative Council would have been regarded as nothing more than the wildest pipe dream. But the Kikuyu "land question" was already a burning problem as more and more tribesmen became convinced that tribal land was being taken away from them by white settlers. The Kikuyu also already resented the identity cards used to control them as a labor force, the

low wages averaging \$2.50 a month, and the hut tax which amounted to \$3.00 a year in 1922.

Kenyatta soon came to the conclusion that Africans could only help themselves if they organized into a Western-type political party. He had a flair for organization and found he could speak fluently and use his personal magnetism to bend others to his will. In 1929 he left for England "to interview the Secretary of State on problems affecting the Kikuyu tribe and particularly the land question." Despite assistance from liberals in London, already taking an interest in African problems, he was not granted an interview with the Colonial Secretary.

The same year, 1929, a trip was arranged for him to the Soviet Union, but it had no particular influence over him and he never became a Communist. He was also helped by the Communist League Against Imperialism while he was in London, but he became disillusioned with this body long before his return to Kenya in 1930.

### Exile For 16 Years

In 1931 he returned to London and, though he did not know it when he left Kenya, he was to be away from his homeland for the next 16 years. During that time he acted intermittently as a personal lobbyist on behalf of Kenya Africans—presenting their petitions to the Colonial office and ventilating African grievances before the British public. During his long sojourn in England he led a varied life: he went to a Quaker school; did a course in Anthropology; wrote his book *Facing Mount Kenya*; lectured; worked as a farm laborer in the Sussex village of Storrington; and helped Kwame Nkrumah, W. E. B. Du Bois, and George Padmore organize the famous 1945 meeting of the Pan-African Congress in Manchester.

In September 1946 he returned to Kenya. With his uncanny eye for publicity, his first act was to kneel and kiss the soil of his beloved Africa. This happened at a time when the British Labor government and the Governor of Kenya, Sir Philip Mitchell, were gravely miscalculating

the potential strength of African nationalism, which Kenyatta was beginning to symbolize. Refusing to recognize him as a national leader, they tried to tempt him with minor jobs in local government and then condemned him bitterly when he turned instead to organize Kenya's first effective African party, the Kenya African Union.

### Early Demands Ignored

Kenyatta was soon demanding elective African representation in the Legislative Council; African voters on the electoral rolls; the abolition of the color bar; and a solution to the land problem. But the government was quite unprepared to make any concessions and soon Kenya was sliding down the slippery slope to Mau Mau. Kenyatta tried to use constitutional weapons, but many of his young supporters talked the language of violence, with an end in view that was very different from Kenyatta's—they wanted to see the white man driven out of Kenya altogether.

The varied forces of African nationalism met in headlong collision with the immovability of government in the Mau Mau explosion. With equal inevitability, Kenyatta was singled out as the leader of opposition to government and hastily removed from the scene. The British method of doing this was to give him a scrupulous trial, but no one was surprised when he was found guilty of managing Mau Mau and given the maximum sentence of seven years of hard labor.

What part had Kenyatta actually played? Few people would claim today that he was the organizer of Mau Mau terrorism. But was he, as the liberals and Kenya Africans believe, a constitutional leader swept along in a violent movement that he was unable to control? Or was he indirectly responsible for the Mau Mau terror? Did he turn a conveniently blind eye to his violent associates and do nothing to prevent their murderous progress?

### Trial Inconclusive

These questions will be argued through history. Kenyatta's trial did not give a final answer, for the trial itself has been bitterly challenged and criticized ever since the magistrate read his 88-page judgement on April 8, 1953. Nor has the official Corfield Report into the *Growth and Origins of Mau Mau*, published as a white paper in 1960, been helpful, for it has widely been dismissed as an attempt by the Kenya Government to justify Kenyatta's prolonged restriction.

Kenyatta's friends point to his repeated private denunciations of Mau Mau, to his gentle disposition, to the deep friendships that he made in Britain, to the liberal wisdom that he often revealed, and they ask: "How can a man like that have been guilty of leading a murderous or-

ganization like Mau Mau?" But Kenyatta's critics doggedly maintain that he is a man who never fully emerged into the modern world. They say he showed too much respect for atavistic tribal customs; that his character has always been oddly streaked with odd, irrational quirks from primitive Africa.

While Kenyatta is still detained there can be no final answer about him. When the crisis came, he acted like many other leaders of nationalism, rising against colonial rule—in Cyprus, Ireland, and other British colonies. And he faced special difficulties precisely because he was the leader of a tribe whose people mixed their love of their primitive past with their eager desire for the fruits of modern civilization.

But now things have changed. Everything that Kenyatta ever campaigned for has now been achieved and much more besides. He can never again be placed amid the dilemmas of Mau Mau. What kind of man will the myth turn out to be in the new political context of the 1960's?

—Alan Rake

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# ECONOMIC NOTES

## **Japanese Economic Mission Finds East Africa Promising**

The first of several projected Japanese trade missions visited East Africa in February and March, and reported favorably on the future for Japanese investment in the three territories. The nine man mission, headed by Japanese Ambassador-at-Large Fumihiko Kai, represented both the Japanese Government and private engineering and textile interests. It explored the possibility of providing practical economic and technical assistance for industry, through Japanese investment in joint ventures with local manufacturers in textile and other light industries.

## **Ethiopia Gets DLF Loan To Further Lumber Industry**

Approval of a \$180,000 loan to help purchase sawmill equipment in the United States to establish a timber products exporting industry in Ethiopia was announced by the US Development Loan Fund (DLF) on March 14. The project envisages the logging of 75,000 to 100,000 acres of forest and establishment of a log-squaring mill and a sawmill to produce semi-finished wood for export to the Middle East. The export sales possible from this new industry are an estimated \$3,000,000 per year, which would help Ethiopia reduce its dependence on coffee as a source of foreign exchange. The borrower is the Atlas Engineering and Contracting Company, S.A., an Ethiopian corporation owned by US citizens. The firm will provide the major part of the project's finance, the cost of labor and local materials, from its own resources.

## **British Capital to Support Sierra Leone Water Scheme**

Sierra Leone's long-planned Guma Valley Water Scheme will be completed in 1965 as the result of an agreement, announced in March, between the Sierra Leone Government, The Colonial Development Corporation, and the Commonwealth Development Finance Company Ltd. The two British organizations will jointly contribute £2,400,000 toward completion of the scheme.

The Guma Valley Scheme, begun in 1946, is designed to provide Freetown and surrounding villages with water from a dam in the steep-sided Guma Gorge, about 16 road miles south of Freetown. The Scheme and existing water facilities in the area will be combined under one company, in which the two UK organizations will participate.

The government has already spent £1,650,000 in preparations for the 900 foot long earth dam, which will be

190 feet above the river bed at its highest point. This dam, for which the contract was let in March, will cost £2,000,000, and will hold back a 4,400,000,000 gallon lake over two miles long, which can be developed as a fish supply. Although no specific plans have been announced, the dam could also provide the water for a future hydroelectric generating station.

## **World Bank Approves Uganda Electricity Expansion**

Expansion of electric power distribution throughout Uganda, to take advantage of existing excess generating capacity, will be assisted by an \$8,400,000 loan made to Uganda on March 29 by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank).

The 120,000 kilowatt hydroelectric generating plant at Owen Falls supplies most of Uganda's electric power, but operates at about half capacity. The industrial development which had been expected to follow the availability of power has not been great enough to use the plant's full capacity. The Uganda Electricity Board's development program to use this excess capacity by extending transmission lines will take until 1963, and will cost an estimated \$14,000,000. The work will be carried out partly by the Board, and partly by contractors selected by competitive bidding from local and foreign firms. The Bank loan is to help meet the cost of imported goods and services.

The extensions to the transmission system will make electricity available for the first time to many parts of Uganda. The present line to Soroti, east of Lake Kyoga, will be enlarged and extended northwest to Gulu, over 500 miles north of Kampala. A line will be built northwest from Kampala toward Lake Albert to Hoima and Masindi. A third line will be built westward toward Mount Ruwenzori to the Kilembe Copper Mines and to Fort Portal. This will bring public power to tea estates, factories, and cotton ginneries for the first time, and permit the copper mines to expand their output.

## **Raisman Commission Endorses East African Common Market**

The existing common market between Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda should be continued, but its revenue should be redistributed to equalize its effects on the separate territories, according to the report of a special Economic and Fiscal Commission appointed by the UK Secretary of State for the Colonies. (See *Africa Report*, June 1960, p. 11). The Commission, whose recommendations were published by H. M. Stationery Office in

February (Cmd1279, 5 shillings), was composed of Sir Jeremy Raisman, Chairman, and Professors A. J. Brown and R. C. Treaves.

The Commission concluded that, under the present common market arrangements, none of the territories was worse off than it would otherwise have been, and that none would gain by withdrawing from it. To make this common market more effective, however, the Report suggests agreement by the territories on principles governing inter-territorial trade and marketing policy, and a more effective coordination of the territories' price and trade policies with the assistance of an economic adviser and secretariat attached to the High Commission. Redistribution of the common market benefits through a central pool of revenue administered by the High Commission was also recommended. The annual income of the pool would be 40 percent of the income tax on company profits on manufacturing and finance, and six percent of the revenue from customs and excise duties.

Half of this annual income would be redistributed to the individual territories in equal amounts, in order to spread the benefits of the common market's tariff more evenly among the three territories. Manufacturing industry in Kenya now benefits more from the East African tariffs on manufactured goods than do the predominantly agricultural economies of Tanganyika and Uganda, which must import most of their manufactured goods or buy them from Kenya. The other half of the income of the central pool of revenue would be retained by the High Commission to pay for the services it renders (other than those, such as the railway, which are self-financed), which are now financed by funds voted separately by each territorial legislature.

The Report also suggests the renaming of the East Africa High Commission to "Central Commission for East Africa", and the further review of the structure in three or four years.

## **Ghana's Western Region To Be Opened By Navigation**

Ghana's Western Region will be opened to more efficient development by the construction of a canal system linking the Tano River with the sea at Half-Assini. The canal system is to be constructed mainly to serve the \$4,500,000 cement plant of the Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd. at Bonyeri, but it will also provide the relatively undeveloped Western Region with an access route to the sea facilitating export and development of its cocoa, palm oil, and other products.

—Norman W. Mosher

# The Brazzaville Twelve: How They Came To Be

(Continued from page 2)

the Senegal Prime Minister, Mamadou Dia, came to Abidjan to settle details of the proposed meeting.

As with the Casablanca Group, it is not entirely clear who was and who was not invited to the original meeting. Guinea's leaders, for example, vociferously condemned the conference and said they would not attend; but it was never made clear whether they had been invited. Mali, it seems, had received an invitation of sorts; at any rate it was represented by an observer. Togo had certainly been invited; but Prime Minister Sylvanus Olympio made it a condition of his attendance that Tunisia and Morocco should also be at the Abidjan meeting, arguing that it was manifestly useless to discuss the Algerian problem in any kind of constructive way without the two African states who know most about it.

## North Africa Excluded

But it seems that the two North African states were not invited. In any case, Morocco let it be known that she would not attend even if invited, since she would definitely not sit at the same table as the "pseudo-Premier of the pseudo-state of Mauritania,"

who was very definitely attending the conference. There were no North African representatives at Abidjan, and Sylvanus Olympio did not appear. Indeed, he has made no move since then to join the Group.

## Madagascar Reconsiders

On the other hand, Madagascar President Tsiranana, who declined an invitation to Abidjan, has since become converted to membership. The most francophile of all the French African leaders, he let it be known at the time of Abidjan that he considered the Algerian problem to be an "internal French matter" and therefore no concern of the French African states. He has not repeated that contention; but doubtless it will not be forgotten in Africa. It seems that no representative from the Congo (Leopoldville) had been invited; nevertheless, President Fulbert Youlou of Congo (Brazzaville) turned up with Albert Kalonji of South Kasai.

The Abidjan communique's remarks on Mauritania were, I think, of great consequence. It was undoubtedly one of the factors which prompted Morocco to organize the Casablanca conference, the object of which, in my view, was not merely to discuss Algeria and

the Congo from another angle, but to rally support for Morocco's claim to Mauritania as a part of Greater Morocco. As for the Congo, the Abidjan meeting did not at that stage intervene, though its participants were already showing their preference for those opposed to Lumumba.

The next meeting of the Brazzaville Group was held at Brazzaville, capital of the former French Congo, in December 1960. The Group takes its name from this city rather than from Abidjan, scene of its original meeting, because it was confirmed at Brazzaville that the Group had long-term objectives and meant to stay in existence, cooperating on economic problems as well as over external policy.

## Shared Perspectives


Brazzaville showed that the 12 states which attended the meeting—all those who had been at Abidjan, except the Mali observer (Mali had clearly not been invited on this occasion) and with the addition of Madagascar—shared a desire to remain friends with the *ancienne mere patrie*, France; all shared in condemnation of various aspects of Soviet policy and showed no desire to encourage a Communist presence in Africa, through economic help or in any other shape; and all were seeking what were qualified as compromise solutions to the two burning African problems, Congo and Algeria.

All present were united on one other issue: they were opposed to the creation of political links among the independent African states. Though they were all in favor of close co-operation over a wide field of action, they still obstinately stuck to Houphouet-Boigny's old thesis that common political institutions in independent Africa were both wasteful and unnecessary.

## The Brazzaville Charter

The communique which emerged from the Brazzaville meeting in December was much longer than the Abidjan communique. In a sense it constitutes a charter for the Group. It has lengthy preambles about the need for peace, for national construction, and international cooperation. The first major point in the communique refers to Algeria. There must, it says, be peace in Algeria in 1961. France must put an end to the war, and the Algerians be given the right to self-determination. (This item has been variously interpreted; but it is generally believed that the Brazzaville Group has made it clear that it could not continue to support France if Algeria were not established

(Continued on page 12)





# News Review

## Tshombe Arrest Opens New Chapter

The Tananarive Conference during the second week in March set in motion a marathon palaver in the Congo. For seven weeks, there was an almost constant round of on-again-off-again conferences, *tete-a-tetes*, telegrams, and letters among the various competitors for power and their representatives. By mid-April, there were recurrent rumors—not entirely dispelled by recurrent denials—that military and/or political representatives of Antoine Gizenga and the central government of Joseph Kasavubu were meeting quietly and ironing out some of their differences.

On April 11, and again on April 21, Major General Joseph Mobutu claimed that he has elicited recognition of his overall authority as commander-in-chief from field commanders of Congolese Army factions under Gizenga, though Gizenga himself denies this.

The dominant thread running through this maze was the new and more positive attitude of President Kasavubu's contingent, who clearly had had some second thoughts about the agreement he had signed at Tananarive calling for the creation of a loose confederation of Congolese states with virtually no power at the center. This agreement, seen by observers as almost complete capitulation to the views of Katanga President Moise Tshombe, was partly a response to Tshombe's overwhelming personality and partly to the threat which seemed to exist at that time of a mounting Gizenga military offensive.

As this latter threat withered and died, Kasavubu's need for Tshombe conversely lessened and events took a new turn. Indeed, Kasavubu's government found, through backstage negotiations, that the differences with Gizenga, or at least with Gizenga's aides, were not as great as before; above all, both needed the United Nations to withstand the greater threat of Tshombe.

Observers were beginning to develop a tentative optimism that the sequel to Tananarive—the conference of 200 politicians which opened at Coquilhatville, Equator Province on April 23—might see a compromise political solution worked out. By the end of the opening day, however, it was clear that the month of palaver had not mellowed President Tshombe's views, and that he would stand pat on his demand for the loosest possible confederation of independent states and for the renunciation by Kasavubu of the latter's April 17 agreement to cooperate with the United Nations.

On April 24, talk was once more abandoned for action when central government troops arrested Mr. Tshombe as he tried to walk out of

the Coquilhatville parley. On April 30, Kasavubu's Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko—who seems to be a rising figure in the Congolese drama—announced that (1) Tshombe would be moved to Leopoldville and held indefinitely, (2) President Kasavubu would take all necessary steps, with UN assistance if necessary, to bring Katanga back under the control of the central government; and (3) nation-wide sovereignty would, by hook or by crook, be established over all army factions in the Congo.

## Togo Voters Confirm Olympio's Popularity

Togolese voters turned out in full force for the elections of April 9 to name incumbent Prime Minister Sylvanus Olympio as the country's first President under a new constitution.

Official figures indicate that 90.2 percent of the electorate—566,600 voters out of 628,348 registered—went to the polls. On the constitutional referendum, 560,306 voters cast their ballots in favor of the draft approved in March by Parliament, and 2,105 voted against. In the presidential and parliamentary election, the list of President Olympio's powerful *Comite de l'Unité Togolaise* won 560,926 votes out of a total of 563,878 cast. However, the candidates of the opposition parties, the *Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise* (JUVENTO) and the *Union Democratique du Peuple Togolaise* (UDPT) were not inscribed on the ballot because the Interior Minister said they were submitted "outside the time limit set by law." (See "Togo: Africa's New Pressure Point" and "Profile of Prime Minister Olympio," *Africa Report*, April 1960).

## Sierra Leone Celebrates Full Independence

Sierra Leone declared a week-long public holiday in celebration of the country's transition from a British colony to an independent state on April 27. (See "Sierra Leone: Independence Without Pain," *Africa Report*, April 1961). Parades, church services, exhibitions, receptions, banquets, and balls marked the occasion in Freetown, while Sierra Leone missions abroad were also hosts at a series of festivities. In Washington, Charge d'Affaires William Fitzjohn—soon to become his country's High Commissioner to the United Kingdom—entertained at a flag-raising ceremony at the new Embassy at 4821 Colorado Avenue NW and at an independence reception. A special religious service at the Washington Cathedral on Sunday, April 30 also commemorated the event.

One preparation for Independence Day was the arrest, on April 18, of 15 leaders of the All-Peoples' Congress party, reportedly because of threats by the opposition party to stir

up trouble if elections were not held before independence. There has not been an election in Sierra Leone since 1957, but at the constitutional conference last year in London the consensus of the all-party delegation was that elections could be postponed until after the British handed over control. They are tentatively set for February 1962.

This position was strenuously protested at the time by the leader of the All-Peoples' Congress, Siaka Stevens, who has stepped up his criticism of the government in the last few months, and particularly since the official merger—early in April—of the governing Sierra Leone People's Party of Prime Minister Sir Milton Margai and the People's National Party, led by Albert Margai. The PNP, once a strong opponent of the SLPP, has been participating in a coalition government since May 1960.

## Nigeria To Create A New Mid-West Region

The Nigerian Federal Parliament on April 4 unanimously adopted a government-sponsored motion calling for the creation of a fourth region in the Federation.

The proposed new state, to be known as the Mid-West Region, is to be carved out of the Western Region, where the opposition Action Group is predominant. The principal residents of the proposed new Region are the Bini, a small minority group ethnically akin to the dominant Yoruba tribe but retaining some degree of separateness. The Action Group, led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, countered with a proposal to split all three regions to take into account similar demands for separate status by minority groups in the North and East.

## Peace Corps Attacked At Cairo Conference

The third All-African Peoples' Conference, held in Cairo from March 26 to 30, was attended by some 200 delegates representing 69 different political, trade union, and women's groups in 36 African countries and territories. As at the first (Accra, December 1958) and second (Tunis, January 1960) meetings, the decisions of the conference are not binding on any African state, since the delegates—who range from prominent public figures to dissident exiles—attend as representatives of organizations rather than of governments. In addition to the registered delegates, there were some 175 observers from about 30 countries outside of Africa; the majority of these came from the Communist Bloc nations.

Although colonialism and neo-colonialism have always been a dominant theme of the All-African Peoples' Conferences, this one exceeded both previous gatherings in

## African Political Calendar—

(A tentative list of scheduled political developments)

- May 4:** Elections in Nigeria's Northern Region for a new, enlarged House of Assembly of 170 members.
- May 8:** President Sekou Toure's announced official visit to the United Arab Republic.
- May 8:** Tentative opening date for "All-African Summit Conference" called for Monrovia, Liberia by the chiefs of state of Liberia, Nigeria, Guinea, Mali, Ivory Coast, Togo, and Cameroun. By April 25, Monrovia reported that 16 of the 20 states invited had accepted.
- May 15-25:** UNESCO education conference in Addis Ababa "to establish an inventory of the educational needs of the countries of Africa."
- May 28:** Conference of the All-African Trade Union Federation opens in Casablanca to discuss future of the African labor movement.
- June 1:** Northern British Cameroons to be officially absorbed by Nigeria under UN authorization.
- July:** Meeting of the Brazzaville Twelve at Tananarive, Malagasy Republic.
- August 1961:** UN-sponsored legislative elections in the Belgian-administered Trust Territories of Ruanda-Urundi, leading to probable independence in 1962.
- September:** Probable date for Uganda Constitutional Conference in London.
- October 1:** Southern British Cameroons to be officially absorbed into the Cameroun Republic.

the vehemence and emotionalism of the attacks on the West. While France, Britain, Israel, West Germany, and the Netherlands came in for their usual share of criticism, major abuse was directed at the United Nations, the United States, and Belgium. Observers noted, however, that the anti-US line of the conference was not accompanied by explicit praise of the Soviet Bloc.

The consensus of delegates was that President Kennedy's Peace Corps should be "mercilessly opposed" because its aim is to "reconquer and economically dominate Africa." Even the President's request for sharp increases in the African aid budget was seen as evidence of a neo-colonialist plan for domination, and the US vote in the United Nations condemning Portuguese policy decried as a "maneuver to deceive the Africans and win their sympathy." Africans were also warned against imperialist agents in the guise of religious or philanthropic organizations "such as Moral Re-armament."

The Conference delegates voted overwhelmingly in favor of several measures for furthering African political and economic unity, and also demanded the immediate release of Jomo Kenyatta, economic sanctions against South Africa, the independence of the Rhodesias, the elimination of all military bases from Africa, and the end of the South African mandate over South-West Africa.

Although speakers repeatedly attacked the UN and the conference passed resolutions condemning the world organization as "directly responsible for all that goes on in the Congo," demanding the dismissal of Hammarskjöld, and urging revision

of the charter and immediate reorganization of the Secretariat, there was a note of ambivalence in the attitude toward the world organization. For the conference also urged that the problems of the Portuguese colonies and the Central African Federation be taken up by the UN as soon as possible. Non-violent methods of political emancipation, which were strongly upheld at Accra and, to a lesser extent, at Tunis, received little attention.

Among the African personalities attending were Tom Mboya and Ronald Ngala of Kenya, Joshua Nkomo of Southern Rhodesia, Kanyama Chiume of Nyasaland, Mrs. Felix Mumié of Cameroun, Reverend Michael Scott, John Tettegah of Ghana, and James Callaghan and Fenner Brockway of Britain. The French-speaking states, except for Guinea and Mali, were represented only by dissident exiles, and Nigeria, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Ghana all had smaller and less notable delegations than at previous sessions. The next meeting was scheduled for Bamako in 1962.

## Haile Selassie Completes Major Cabinet Reshuffle

Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia announced on April 14 that he had completed a major governmental reorganization which has been going on since a rebellion against his rule was suppressed in December; several key civilian members of the government were killed by the rebels at that time.

The new team is headed by Prime Minister Teshafi Tezaz Akilu Habte Wold, former Minister of Foreign

Affairs, and includes Ato Yilma Deressa, former Ambassador to the United States, as Minister of Finance; Lij Mikael Imru, father of the present Ambassador to the United States, as Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Lij Endelkachu Mekonnen, former Ambassador to the United Kingdom, as Minister of Commerce and Industry. Junior posts have gone to 25 men in their twenties.

In another aftermath of the abortive coup, 45-year old General Mengistu Neway, former commander of the Imperial Bodyguard, was hanged in the public market place of Addis Ababa on March 30. He was convicted of having been one of the ring leaders of the December revolt. Two other bodyguard officers were sentenced to 15 and 10 years respectively.

## Fulbert Youlou Wins In Congo Election

Fulbert Youlou, long the dominant political figure in the Congo Republic (Brazzaville), took an easy win in late March in the first national elections held since independence. He was elected President, as specified in the new presidential-type constitution, by an electorate of 420,000, including 3,000 Europeans. Leaders of all political parties supported him.

## KADU Will Form Kenya Government

After three days of negotiation with Governor Sir Patrick Renison, leaders of the Kenya African Democratic Union announced on April 18 that the party would cooperate in the formation of a government.

KADU's action broke a 48-day deadlock between the government and the two major African political parties over the issue of Jomo Kenyatta's release from detention in northern Kenya (see "Jomo Kenyatta: The Man and the Myth," page 5). The governor reportedly has agreed that work will begin immediately on the construction of a house for Kenyatta and his family in the Kiambu district near Nairobi, where he formerly lived, and that he will be allowed to return there "in due course." But there has been no indication so far that the government will go along with the demand that Kenyatta be given unequivocal release prior to the formation of a government.

Because of the necessity of action on Kenya's 1961-62 budget by June 30, the government had let it be known that it could not wait much longer for a break in the deadlock and would shortly have to resort either to the nomination of sufficient officials to round out a Legislative Council or to government by decree.

After seeing Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod in London, KANU

# News Review

Secretary-General Tom Mboya on April 21 criticized the KADU decision and reaffirmed that KANU will take no part in the Government of Kenya until Jomo Kenyatta is released unconditionally. Meanwhile, in Nairobi, the main body of Mr. Mboya's party closed ranks to support this position, though two KANU members of the Legislative Council indicated that they would support the new government and two others, also restive under the domination of the KANU by Kikuyu and Luo personalities, were said to be wavering. A move by Dr. J. G. Kiano, American-educated Kikuyu and former Minister of Commerce and Industry, to join a major section of KANU with KADU to form a revival of the old Kenya African Union party created by Jomo Kenyatta in 1946, did not make much headway.

## Death Toll Mounts In Angola Rebellion

Reports from Angola this month indicate that most of the northern part of the vast territory is now in a state of siege. The nationalist rebels, using small arms imported through the neighboring Congo, are reportedly attacking selected targets in small, well-organized Commando groups, and the Portuguese authorities are responding with severe repressive measures that reportedly include mass arrests, the razing of villages, and shooting fleeing Africans. There have been no reliable reports of casualties, which are said to be high.

In Lisbon, Premier Antonio de Oliveira Salazar has taken over the portfolio of defense, ordered nearly \$7,000,000 of supplementary military expenditure for Angola and Mozambique, called all Portuguese security and army forces to stand by in "a state of prevention," and instituted a sweeping reorganization of his cabinet, the armed forces, and overseas ministries. The *New York Times* correspondent in Portugal reported on April 15 that Dr. Salazar "has just forestalled a move by a powerful bloc in the armed forces to force him into retirement and to replace him with a military junta more likely to suppress the uprising in Angola with vigor." To counter this move, the Portuguese Premier has "abruptly dismissed Defense Minister Julio Botelho Moniz and several generals" and is recasting his cabinet with younger men of unquestioned loyalty to him; he reportedly plans to make suppression of the fast-spreading rebellion a matter of national priority. The political, social, and educational reforms for Angola announced by the Portuguese Government in March have been indefinitely postponed.

The American Methodist Board in the United States has charged that at least eight Angolan Protestant

pastors (all Africans) have been killed by unofficial Portuguese "vigilante" groups and that many more pastors have disappeared since the rebellion broke out on March 15. According to the Methodist charge, there has been a mounting campaign in the controlled Angolan press against "catequistas"—Africans educated at Protestant missions—on the grounds that they are agents of foreign subversion.

## UN General Assembly Denounces South Africa

The United Nations General Assembly on April 7 adopted unanimously—by a vote of 84 to 0 with 8 abstentions—a resolution accusing South Africa of imposing a reign of tyranny and racial terror in South-West Africa.

On April 13, by a vote of 95 to Portugal's 1, the Assembly approved a resolution deploring the apartheid policy of South Africa and suggesting that all countries decide for themselves on taking separate or collective action to influence the Union government to abandon the policy. A much stronger resolution, calling for diplomatic and economic sanctions against South Africa because of its racial policies, failed to pass the General Assembly. This latter measure, introduced by 24 African countries, Indonesia, and Cuba, obtained a simple majority (42 to 34, with 21 abstentions), but failed to return the required two-thirds for passage.

## Nkrumah Declares War On Patronage, Nepotism

The most dramatic development in Africa this month was Ghana President Kwame Nkrumah's dawn radio address to his countrymen on April 8 launching a new campaign against corruption and backbiting within the governing Convention People's Party. Dr. Nkrumah's action, prompted by some acrimonious intra-party exchanges during his absence from the country in March to attend the Commonwealth Conference in London and to visit the United States, went far beyond the immediate issue to spell out a new moral code for Ghanaian politics:

- Members of the CPP must not use their party membership or official position for personal gain or for the amassing of wealth. Henceforth, a limit will be imposed "on property acquisition by Ministers, party officials, and ministerial secretaries to enable them to conform to the modest and simple way of life demanded by the ideals and principles of the Convention People's Party." Any party member who wishes to be a businessman can do so, but he must give up his seat in Parliament.

- "Ostentatious living" on the part of party and government officials is to be strongly discouraged as inconsistent with "the Party constitution, which makes it clear that the aims and objects of the party . . . are the building of a Socialist pattern of society . . ."

- Similarly, trade unionists (who have been the principal critics of Parliamentary businessmen) must realize that "unbridled trade unionism" is a product of colonial thinking and also out of date. To counter this attitude, four organizations—the workers', women's, farmers', and co-operative movements—will abandon their own flags and membership cards and be brought under rigid party control.

- Future travel abroad by officials will not be paid for unless each trip has the prior approval of the cabinet.

- "The evil of patronage . . . and its twin brother, nepotism, must be uprooted."

- Steps will be taken to discourage the practice of diplomats taking their children abroad with them. Since this is not justifiable on either financial or psychological grounds, children over five years of age will begin their education at home.

- In order to reduce "red tape-ism", bureaucracy, and waste, the government will be reorganized to deal with a "revolutionary era." A Ministry of African Affairs will be created separate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministries of Labor and Social Affairs will be abolished and their functions absorbed by the Ministries of Education and Trade.

- The recent decision to create a state buying agency for cocoa will be rescinded in response to farmer complaints, and this function will be transferred to the Ghana Farmers' Council with the stipulation that the Council's accounts will be audited by the Auditor General.

- Ghana's position as a vanguard of the African liberation movement imposes upon Ghanaians increasing responsibility "to set our own house in order" and to "set very high standards" which others may emulate.

## Mali, Ghana, Guinea Sign Union Charter

The presidents of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali convened in Accra on April 29 to formalize their December decision to form a union. A charter formally establishing a tripartite "Union of African States" was signed by Presidents Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, and Modibo Keita.

In December, the three leaders said they envisaged a "common economic and monetary policy" and common diplomatic representatives, but that their political association would remain loose.



# The Brazzaville Twelve: How They Came To Be

(Continued from page 8)

as an independent nation in 1961). The Group showed clearly that it feared Communist help to the Algerian nationalists.

The communique proclaimed the belief of the Group that a political solution to the Congo could be found at a roundtable conference representative of all political parties. The twelve had urged the Congolese visitors to their meeting to arrange such a conference, and President Kasavubu and Katanga's Moise Tshombe had indeed promised to organize one for mid-February. Whether the Brazzaville Group actually urged the Congolese President to invite imprisoned Patrice Lumumba to the roundtable conference has never been clear, but it is quite obvious that the Brazzaville leaders are not all as single-minded in their support of Kasavubu or in their opposition to the Lumumbists as is one of their number—the Abbe Fulbert Youlou, President of the Congo (Brazzaville).

## Neo-Colonialism Denounced

All were, however, unquestionably united in denouncing a "new form of colonialism" which consisted of rival blocs trying to re-colonize the Congo "either directly or indirectly or through the intermediary of some Asian and African countries." Once again, the Brazzaville Group's suspicion of the Soviet Union and of any African country which appeared to be supporting it, had come to the surface.

Next, Brazzaville touched again on the Mauritanian issue. The Soviet Union had vetoed Mauritania's application for membership of the United Nations; but the Brazzaville states gave notice that Mauritania, a member of the Group and a country which had fought a "heroic though pacific battle for its independence," could count on the support of the rest of the Group, who would again sponsor Mauritania's membership of the United Nations.

## Long-Term Plans Laid

Finally, the Brazzaville communique dealt with long-term cooperation among its members. A detailed agenda was set down for the economic study group which met in Dakar at the end of January, and which agreed on a permanent Inter-State Economic Secretariat, as well as other forms of economic cooperation. It was decided that the Group would meet again on March 15 at Yaounde in the Cameroun Republic to discuss a mutual defense pact, and other matters. Houphouet-Boigny's own party organ, *Fraternite*, described the Brazzaville meeting as the birth of a new bloc, formed according to a formula long

advocated by Houphouet-Boigny and devoted to peace and brotherhood. It was clearly not intended to be exclusive and would be open to other like-minded States.

## THE YAOUNDE MEETING

At the third meeting of the Brazzaville Twelve held in Yaounde, Cameroun during the last week in March, the member states chose President Philibert Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic as President of the organization, which is henceforth to be called the "Union of African States and Madagascar." Also discussed were air communications in Africa, relations with the European Economic Community, and investments.

It is worth noting that by no means all the members of the Brazzaville Group are inside the French Community, and indeed Houphouet-Boigny has made it clear that he has no intention of joining it. The Group is, in theory at any rate, open to English-speaking countries in Africa. The reason why Brazzaville has got off to a relatively united start, however, would appear to be not merely that its members all share certain attitudes to inter-African relationships and to external policy, but also that they all speak French and have shared a common colonial past.

## Language Differences Plague

The Casablanca Group's cohesion is perhaps threatened more than Brazzaville's by the differences in "background" among its members. One of them, Ghana, belongs to the English-speaking group of territories in Africa; Guinea and Mali both have the common background of colonies within the French West African complex, and of political development inside the *Rassemblement Democratique Africain*; Morocco and Libya are both monarchies, whose internal policies can scarcely be considered progressive; and, finally, the United Arab Republic stands even more squarely in the Arab rather than the African tradition than Morocco.

Undoubtedly Algeria and the Congo were the motive forces in bringing these countries together at the Casablanca conference. Membership of the Afro-Asian Group at the United Nations had shown them that they shared common views on these two issues, and that they were all opposed to the pro-Western and "un-African" attitude which the Brazzaville Group had adopted. They wanted to counter Brazzaville's threat to the cohesion of the Afro-Asian Group, while Morocco

itself took the initiative in organizing the conference because it wanted also to rally support for its claims to Mauritania. The conference had long been rumored; invitations were finally sent out after the Brazzaville Group had wrecked the FLN-sponsored motion at the UN and after it had thrown out its second challenge on Mauritania.

## Lumumba's Key

Casablanca confirmed, as was only to be expected, that this particular Group supported, above all else, Mr. Lumumba—and what he stood for—in the Congo, and the FLN in Algeria. Indeed, Casablanca virtually gave the FLN *carte blanche*—which, in the weeks following Casablanca, meant a far less belligerent policy towards France than certain members of the Casablanca Group might themselves have advocated.

The political charter at the beginning of the Casablanca communique goes considerably beyond the few platitudes expressed in the Brazzaville communique. It shows that the Casablanca powers, in contrast to the Brazzaville ones, do believe in the desirability of political links. But are they really all ready to do something about it? The charter itself represents a compromise between Dr. Nkrumah, who wanted rapid tackling of this objective, and others who paid lip-service to the idea without showing any willingness to give up one real iota of political sovereignty. Because of the emphasis on political links, Casablanca, even though it set up an economic committee, still seems far from envisaging the same kind of economic cooperation on which the Brazzaville Group appears to be embarking.

## Lines are Tenuous

Comparisons between the two Groups are, of course, inevitable. But, it would be a great mistake to indulge in over-classification. Both were formed under the impetus of specific issues, where various countries happened to find themselves in opposite camps. If there are settlements in the Congo and Algeria, then the Casablanca Group may well lose its present cohesion.

On the other hand, the Brazzaville Group—if its members succeed in working together—may well find that economic ties do after all lead precisely to those political links which Houphouet-Boigny has always deprecated. In the end, there may yet be a place in the same firmament for Guinea and for the Ivory Coast. If the disillusionment of the *Entente* states with France should grow, some

(Continued on page 15)

# The Economists Look At Africa

By HARVEY GLICKMAN

Book Editor

**African Development, A Test for International Cooperation, "Staff Paper,"** by Guy Benveniste and William E. Moran Jr. (*Menlo Park: International Industrial Development Center, Stanford Research Institute, 1960*), 170 pages, \$3.

**Investment and Development Possibilities in Tropical Africa,** by Edward and Mildred Rendl Marcus (*New York: Bookman Associates, 1960*), 286 pages, \$7.50.

**Twin-Brother Hell,** by Richard Sellier (*London: Hutchinson, 1960*), 208 pages, 21s.

Analysts of the African economic scene reach early consensus on the need for "development," the absolute necessity of increasing help from the outside, and on the massive effort which the United States will have to make to get things rolling in this post-colonial era. After that, all seems disputable: "big push" theories vs. "balanced growth" theories, private investment vs. public investment or combinations thereof, bilateral arrangements vs. multilateral or international agency arrangements, etc. The observer may be excused for believing that the contestants' ardor masks their basic uncertainty.

## Resources Impressive

Private and public officials need not be convinced of Africa's economic potentialities. In terms of minerals, certain cash crops, and water power, Africa's possibilities are staggering. Edward and Mildred Marcus, both teachers of economics who have travelled in Africa, survey this material quite satisfactorily. Neither does anyone need to be persuaded that the obstacles to economic development are enormous: an adverse climate, poor soil, inadequate transport, a largely unskilled labor force, and an undeveloped indigenous middle class combine with a discouraging shortage of statistical, economic and social information. The Marcuses cover all these facts too, but Mr. Sellier, in a pile-driving style, conveys their impact by narrating an implausible tale of the growth of a sawmill up-country in the Gold Coast after World War II. (The reader must beware, however, not to mistake the Simenon-type cast of buccaneers, vamps, fools, and knaves for the bureaucratic, mechanized, international ventures in the African style of the 1960's)

While external assistance to developing Africa is clearly called for, what is not yet obvious is how it can be combined with indigenous effort so that useful progress can be made. Guy Benveniste and William Moran,

both on the staff of the Stanford Research Institute, have focused on this problem in their highly readable study, *African Development: A Test for International Cooperation*. They base their analysis on the premise that "an interrelated improvement of . . . government assistance in men and money, foreign investment and trade . . . is required."

Benveniste and Moran discuss each of the four main external factors in detail, examining their historical development and the current difficulties in implementing more fruitful cooperation. In each case and in general they find the Western effort wanting in the coordination of objectives, strategies, and activities—dismayingly noteworthy in the light of the "simple and fairly well coordinated" actions of the Sino-Soviet bloc in Africa.



Public financial assistance, for example, need not necessarily be raised at the outset, if more precise information on the uses, magnitude, and duration of aid can be compiled and if the United States, in particular, shifts its "excessive concern with European sensitivities and too great an emphasis on short-term strategic requirements." The long-term demand will be for greater and greater assistance. For this to be effective, it must be geared into individual country and regional planning and operated on a cooperative, not competitive basis.

Foreign private investment has concentrated in primary products for export and remains largely limited to southern Africa. Political instability at present inspires greater disinvestment than investment in many places. Previous attempts to gain agreement on international guarantees and codes have not been notably successful. Unless private investors spur joint public-private ventures at home, as well as abroad, and unless they show more imagination in sharing ownership and participation with local people, even the most energetic international activity will fail. (Toward illuminating this kind of discussion the Marcus book provides little additional help, offering instead a picture of what ought to happen if good-will and proper conditions prevail. Nor does it seem to give much guidance in discriminating

among various proposals, except via the standard of profitability.)

Finally, Benveniste and Moran point out that increases in public grants and loans, in private investment, and in trained manpower, "while trade remains strangled and fluctuates excessively, will result in a cacophony of misunderstanding." African trade follows patterns typical of other underdeveloped lands. It is dependent on a few commodities whose prices oscillate wildly; it is directed toward single (often protected) metropolitan markets and sources of supply; and it maintains exports inadequate to finance indigenous economic growth. The case for assistance in expansion, diversification, and stabilization is overwhelming. As the Stanford economists suggest, only a genuinely international solution will suffice.

## Larger UN Role

Space precludes enumeration of the various specific recommendations for improvement proposed by Benveniste and Moran—some more definite or more fertile than others, but all worth exploring. In general, they seek "a new institutional framework to harmonize and rationalize" Western and African endeavors and "expanded multilateral action," which would mean increasing the responsibilities of the UN in Africa. They endorse six new institutions: (1) An organization of African states for coordinating economic development, possibly emerging from the proposal for a Council of African Economic Cooperation recently made at the Conference of Independent African States; (2) an African development fund, constituted by receiving contributions from African countries in order to assist member states in emergencies; (3) a coordinating organization for Western aid to Africa, based on the plans and beginning efforts of the Development Assistance Group (US and nine other developed nations) and the new Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; (4) an organization of African states for scientific, cultural, and educational cooperation, perhaps growing out of and extending the mixed European and African Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara; (5) an African commission for private investment, which would increase confrontation of representatives of capital-importing with capital-exporting countries; (6) an African development bank on the lines of the Inter-American Development Bank.

Throughout the Stanford report there blow fresh breezes from the foreign affairs region of the "New Frontier." Military and strategic considerations of the Cold War are

downgraded and African demands are seen in the light of indigenous experiences and attitudes. This self-styled "bold new departure" deserves an equally cogent reply from official quarters.

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**On Alien Rule and Self Government,** by John Plamenatz (*New York: Longmans Green, 1960*), 224 pages, \$3.75.

Who would believe that in 1960 it was still thought necessary "to discuss some of the broad issues involved in the disputes between ruling and dependent peoples in the hope of promoting clearer thinking about them"? Nobody, probably, except a professor at "Oxbridge," which is, of course, exactly what Mr. Plamenatz is—a Fellow of Nuffield College and Oxford University Lecturer in Modern History. Only at Oxford—"the home of lost causes"—could the issue of self-government for the colonies be deemed worthy of an extended essay in political philosophy after all the practical political arguments had been canvassed. At a time when the forms of compromise and the plans for achieving peaceful transfers of power between the ruling nations and their dependencies comprise the critical substance of debate, which still may be affected by public opinion, it seems downright wasteful to bend talent and spend energy to write about colonialism and yet hold that "it would be quite beyond the scope of an essay of this kind to suggest any plan of action for granting self-government to dependent peoples."

#### "Warnings and Suggestions"

Apart from the fact that Mr. Plamenatz reverses the priorities of the current situation—muddled thinking about the issue of independence is hardly the primary difficulty today—he refuses to stick with his own prescriptions. Instead, he offers several "warnings and suggestions" to ruling powers and to newly-independent or soon-to-be independent peoples. Some of them are: "Beware of European settlers . . . Do not try to hold on to a colony or dependency at any cost . . . If you want your people to be treated as equals by the Europeans . . . do not imagine that you can achieve your purpose merely by getting national independence . . . Beware of your resentment against the white peoples . . . Britain, France, Holland and Belgium . . . should form an International Authority to which the countries still administering colonies should be responsible for how they administer them" and so on along similar lines. They would appear to be not only inadequate, but rather gratuitous.

Nevertheless, Mr. Plamenatz has written an intellectually challenging essay—a brilliant summary of the most respectable arguments on each side in any dispute over continued

European domination of subject peoples. (Although events have overtaken the debate, people still argue.) Much of his discussion digresses into fascinating questions, e.g., why were the Romans able to "assimilate" conquered peoples while the English could not (they accepted and utilized the native elites), what are the basic minimum requirements of a free society or of a democracy ("political sophistication" and pressure groups).

His Montenegrin background and continuing interest in the Balkan countries permit Mr. Plamenatz to draw many informative contrasts between political forces there and contemporary problems in other underdeveloped countries today. Finally, with regard to problems of international stability, he contributes some scathing comments on past American tactics. It is a shame Mr. Plamenatz did not devote his considerable skills to elucidating and disentangling the issues of colonialism in 1945 or 1950, for his book today merely serves as intellectual fodder for ruminating undergraduates and as tinder for pyrotechnical debaters.

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#### NOTES:

1. **Tourist in Africa**, by Evelyn Waugh (*Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1960*), 201 pages, \$3.75.

Rather than a book, this is more charitably labelled "an entertainment." In distilling numerous, inconsequential impressions of a quiet, travelling vacation, Mr. Waugh manages to avoid most facts of contemporary relevance and everything of social importance in Africa. Even in summer this would be light fare, but a devoted reader can catch a few old-fashioned Waugh epigrams and one or two funny scenes.

**A History of Sierra Leone 1400-1787**, by A. P. Kup (*New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961*), 212 pages, \$3.75.

Sierra Leone acquired its present identity in the course of two events: the resettlement of freed British slaves after 1787, and the establishment of a protectorate over interior tribes a century later. By concentrating on the early modern period, prior to either of these developments, Dr. Kup has provided a history of the territory later included in the new nation.

The greater part of the book is based upon European merchants' accounts, many of them heretofore unpublished. Several lengthy and valuable reports from agents or visitors in Sierra Leone are printed in full. The narrative augments the documents, but intermittent and unchronological attempts to correlate them with events in Europe or elsewhere are frequently misleading. The author's system of

2. **French-Speaking West Africa in Transition**, by Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schachter (*NY: International Conciliation #528, May 1960*), 61 pages, 35¢.

A remarkable accomplishment: in just a few pages the authors (English and American) outline the principal political forces, which apparently are working to divide rather than unite former French West Africa. Senegal, Guinea, and Ivory Coast emerge as the chief antagonists—ideologically and economically. Presented most clearly is the astuteness of the African leaders, who succeeded in thwarting the aims of their French rulers at virtually every critical stage in the evolution of the French "Union" since 1944.

3. **Profiles of African Leaders**, by Thomas Patrick Melady (*NY: Macmillan, 1961*), 186 pages, \$4.95.

An uncritical, simplistic set of brief biographies. The quotations from speeches and the historical background could be of use to a few general readers, but the discussion conceals as much as it reveals about current African politics.

4. **Our Developing World**, by L. Dudley Stamp (*London: Faber & Faber, 1960*), 195 pages, 12s.

A well-known expert reviews both a set of lectures delivered in 1950 and a book published in 1953, "to set out in plain language some of the great world problems of the day as I see them stemming from the overriding dilemma of people outgrowing space." The result is some high-altitude reconnaissance of the primary considerations in comprehending the problem of economic and social development. An excellent introduction.

5. **Histoire des Peuples de l'Afrique Noire**, by Robert Cornevin (*Paris: Berger-Levrault, "Mondes d'Outre-Mer," 1960*) 716 pages, NF 30.

Part of a massive undertaking to

double footnoting—one set for sources, another for comments—is cumbersome, and compounds the difficulties sometimes created by his hyperbolic style.

The resume of tribal migrations, relatively brief but more readable, is drawn largely from published works. Little attempt has been made to indicate the problematical nature of much of this data; inexplicably radical or rapid tribal movements are sometimes accepted without question. However, the short topical treatments of clothing, warfare, and food are among the livelier sections of the book.

Scholars will welcome the rich source material made available by Dr. Kup. As a pioneer study in one area, this work is a valuable contribution to the development of historical literature for Africa. Its publication during Sierra Leone's year of independence is particularly appropriate.

—Donald L. Wiedner



record the histories of the regions, as well as the individual territories formerly controlled by France in Africa, this book by an administrator of long service will find a place in the libraries of all "Africanists." It is an encyclopedia rather than a narrative, attempting to collate anthropological and historical research about all the major ethnic groupings, their development and interaction over the whole continent. Matters are treated regionally after a long introduction on methods and theories. The latter should provoke much healthy controversy among scholars.

**South Africa and World Opinion**, by Peter Calvocoressi (*New York: Oxford University Press, 1961*), 68 pages, 85¢.

**The Catholic Church in South Africa**, by W. E. Brown, edited by Michael Derrick (*London: Burns & Oates, 1960*), 384 pages, 35s.

Mr. Calvocoressi has capably turned the focus upon the reaction of the world to the policy of apartheid and how this reaction crystallized with the shootings at Sharpeville and Langa last year. He suggests that, although the world was unanimous in condemning the racial policies of South Africa, there were important differences in the sentiments underlying this denouncement. In Europe the major feeling was the humanitarian horror at the loss of lives; in Asia it was more the expression of latent anti-white feeling; in America the reaction had more complex roots: partly humanitarian feelings, partly the need to differentiate our own racial problems from those in the Union, partly the desire to go on record as friends of the Africans and thereby tone down the possible appeal of Communism in Africa.

The author goes on to examine various proposals to apply punitive sanctions to South Africa: expulsion from the Commonwealth, economic boycotts, UN action in South West Africa. Useful are the appendixes containing Macmillan's "wind of change" speech made at Cape Town in 1960, resolutions by various bodies, and the

6. A bevy of guides for school teachers in Africa, all published in 1960 by Evans Brothers Ltd. of London: *School Methods with Younger Children*, by Margaret Grant (227 pages, 12s. 6d.), *Handbook for Geography Teachers in West Africa*, by C. T. Quinn-Young and J. E. H. White (272 pages, 15s.), *Handbook for History Teachers in West Africa*, by R. E. Crookall (270 pages, 15s.), *Nature Study for Africa, Mammals*, by G. F. Thistleton (108 pages, 10s. 6d.), *Athletics, A Coaching Handbook for Tropical Africa*, by D. Millar and J. E. Cawley (128 pages, 7s. 6d.), *As-*

text of the League of Nations directive on the South West Africa mandate.

In *The Catholic Church in South Africa*, Father Brown presents the first scholarly, detailed study of the Roman Catholic faith in South Africa, starting with the arrival of the earliest vicar apostolic at the Cape Colony in 1837 and extending to 1922. Mr. Derrick, the editor of this posthumous work, has added an epilogue to complete the history of the Church to the present, including its stand on race relations.

The development of Catholicism in South Africa had difficult sailing: opposition from Protestant ministers, financial difficulties, the scattering of Catholics over great geographical expanses in the frontier days with a small clergy to maintain them active in church practices. Today only six percent of the total South African population belongs to the Church of Rome, including about 500,000 non-Whites. Yet the Church is an important force. Since the Bantu Education Act of 1953, it has been the only church which has so far managed to keep its mission schools open without government subsidies.

This book will become a standard reference of Catholicism in South Africa but its interest transcends religious lines. It also offers to readers an absorbing account of the social history of the Union in the time period it considers.

—Edward A. Tiryakian

sociation Football, by D. Millar and J. E. Cawley (112 pages, 6s. 6d.), *Pictorial Education Booklets No. 2, Some Raw Materials of West Africa*, by C. T. Quinn-Young (32 pages, 3s.). All represent timely contributions toward meeting a pressing need.

#### BOOKS RECEIVED:

1. *Inventory of Economic Studies Concerning Africa South of the Sahara*, an annotated list of books, articles, and official publications, general editor: Miss Peter Ady (London: Scientific Council of the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara, Pub. #30, 1960), 301 pages, n.p.

2. *Societes d'Initiation Bambara, Le N'Domo, Le Kore*, by Dominique Zahan (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1960), 438 pages, c. NF 40.

#### CORRECTION:

The publisher and price of *The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations*, by L. A. Fabunmi was incorrectly noted in the February issue. It should read: *New York, Longmans Green, \$11.75*. We regret the error and any resulting inconvenience.

### The Brazzaville Twelve: How They Came To Be

(Continued from page 12)

of these Brazzaville countries may stop seeing Communist "manipulation" in every move made by the Casablanca powers.

The trump cards may yet come to be played by those independent African states which have so far kept their distance from the two Groups, but which are nevertheless equally concerned with such matters as the Congo and Algeria, and which also seek greater African unity on the political and the economic plane. They have by no means disassociated themselves from the mainstream of African politics: they are not only actively pursuing their own policies on Algeria and the Congo, but are also preparing for what they consider the right moment to issue a rallying cry to those who believe in African unity.

When they do make the call, there may well be answers from countries in both the Brazzaville and the Casablanca Groups.

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## Two African Views of the US Press . . .

"The American press, more so than any other foreign news media, castigates the efforts of [Africa's] pioneers. . . . What the American press does to damage the influence of the United States abroad cannot be undone by foreign aid or by sending emissaries of the same racial or religious background to these foreign lands."

—Liberian Ambassador to the U.S. George Padmore, at the celebration of Sierra Leone's independence.

"The American press is America's worst enemy in Africa."

—Tom Mboya at the Africa Freedom Day rally in Washington, DC, April 15.

**Africa Freedom Day** rallies in Washington (April 15) and New York (April 17) drew capacity audiences. At upper right, Tom Mboya of Kenya, who addressed both US rallies, greets Harry Belafonte in Washington. Below, Mr. Mboya joins the other principal African participants at the Metropolitan Baptist Church in Washington—standing, left to right: Liberian student William Davis, Thomas Kanza of the Congo, Vusumzi Make of South Africa. Seated: Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rhodesia, and Mr. Mboya.

US Senator Hubert Humphrey and Captain Enrique de Malta Galvao spoke at the rally held at Hunter College in New York, and Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas addressed the meeting in Washington. April 15 was set aside as Africa Freedom Day by the first All African People's Conference in Accra in 1958.

—Photos by Maurice Sorrell



## US Peace Corps To Begin Work in Tanganyika

At his press conference on April 21, President Kennedy announced the first project of the newly-established Peace Corps. At the invitation of the Tanganyika Government, the Peace Corps has agreed to send a group of 30 young American civil engineers, surveyors, and geologists to work in all parts of the country. The Tanganyika project calls for 20 surveyors, four geologists and four civil engineers. Two additional geologists will be sent to Tanganyika in 1962.

All Peace Corps volunteers will work under the direct administration of the Tanganyika Ministers of Communications and Commerce and Industry in projects which the Tanganyika Government deems essential to development of the national economy.

The Peace Corps surveyors, for example, will make basic surveys and alignments for the construction of feeder roads to open intensive agricultural areas to markets. The civil engineers will help supervise the maintenance, grading, and surfacing of major roads, and will oversee the construction of small bridges and the installation of culverts. The four geologists will engage in geological surveying and mapping of areas specified by the Tanganyika Government. In addition to their technical duties, the Peace Corps volunteers will train young Tanganyikans in surveying techniques.

Recruitment of volunteers has already begun, and those selected for Tanganyika will enter a rigorous training course beginning in June. After eight weeks of training and orientation in the United States, the Peace Corps team will proceed to Tanganyika for an additional seven week language and orientation course at Tingaru, near Mt. Kilimanjaro. At that time the Peace Corps Volunteers will be sent in groups of twos and threes to begin working in various parts of the country.

The President's announcement came on the eve of a three week tour of Africa and Asia by R. Sargent Shriver, the director of the Peace Corps. Mr. Shriver, accompanied by three assistants, planned to discuss possible projects with officials in Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, and several other African and Asian nations.

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